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Abstract
Tijs et al (2006) [23] introduce the family of obligation rules for minimum cost spanning tree
problems. We give a generalization of such family. We prove that our family coincides with the set
of rules satisfying an additivity property and a cost monotonicity property. We also provide two new
characterizations for the family of obligation rules using the previous properties. In the first one we
add a property of separability; and in the second one we add core selection.
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1 Introduction
A group of agents demands specific services which can only be provided by a common supplier, called
the source. Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost and they do not care
whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source. These situations are studied in
the literature on “minimum cost spanning tree problems”. Formally, a minimum cost spanning tree
problem is characterized by a set N ∪ {0} and a matrix C. N is the set of agents, 0 is the source,
and for each i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}, cij denotes the cost of connecting i and j. Many real situations can
be modeled in this way. For instance communication networks, such as telephone, internet, wireless
telecommunication, or cable television.
Initially, the objective is to minimize the cost of connecting all agents to the source. This is
achieved by a network of links that has no cycles, which is called a “minimal tree”. Kruskal (1956)
[15] and Prim (1957) [21] designed two algorithms for obtaining a minimal tree. Once such a tree is
obtained, its associated cost has to be divided among the agents. Some authors propose a single rule
for dividing the cost. See, for instance, Bird (1976) [9], Feltkamp et al (1994) [13], Kar (2002) [17],
and Dutta and Kar (2004) [11].
Other authors have studied a family of rules instead of focusing on a single rule. In general, each
family of rules depends on a family of parameters that model relevant aspects of the minimum cost
spanning tree problem which do not appear in the cost matrix. This freedom allows a planner to
choose the rule of the family which best fits a particular problem, which the planner is trying to solve.
For instance, Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-Freire (2008a, 2008b) [4] [5] introduce the family of optimistic
weighted Shapley rules. Each rule in the family is a weighted Shapley value of the so called optimistic
game (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007b) [7]). Thus, each rule depends on a vector of weights
(wi)i∈N in such a way that, the larger the weight of an agent is, the more the agent pays. Suppose
that the source is a dam which provides water for people in a valley, as in Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo
(2008) [2]. Since there are farmers and householders in the valley, agents achieve different benefits from
water supply reliability. We take this aspect into account by using an optimistic weighted Shapley
rule, where wi represents the benefits that agent i obtains from the supply of water.
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In this paper we study two sets of rules. We introduce the family of generalized obligation rules,
which contains the family of obligation rules introduced in Tijs et al (2006) [23]. We also provide two
new characterizations of obligation rules. As a corollary we obtain characterizations of the folk rule
introduced in Feltkamp et al (1994) [13].
Obligation rules are associated with obligation functions. At each stage of Kruskal’s algorithm an
arc is added to the network. The cost of this arc will be paid by the agents who benefit from adding
this arc. Each agent pays the difference between his obligation before the arc is added to the network
and after it is added. In an obligation function the obligation of an agent depends only on the agents
in the connected component (of the network induced by Kruskal’s algorithm) he belongs to.
In this paper we define generalized obligation rules through generalized obligation functions. In a
generalized obligation function the obligation of an agent depends on the whole partition of the agents
defined by the network induced by Kruskal’s algorithm, and not only on the element of the partition
to which the agent belongs to. Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3] define a family of rules through Kruskal’s
algorithm using the so called sharing functions. In Theorem 1 we prove that this family coincides with
the family of generalized obligation rules. Moretti et al (2009) [19] and Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010)
[1] study two families of rules containing obligation rules. We also prove that generalized obligation
rules are unrelated with both families.
One of the most popular approaches to the justification of rules is the axiomatic approach. The
idea is to characterize a rule or a set of rules through desirable properties. Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3]
prove that the set of rules induced by sharing functions is characterized with Strong Cost Monotonicity
(SCM) and Restricted Additivity (RA). SCM says that if a number of connection costs increase
and the rest of connection costs (if any) remain the same, no agent can be better off. Namely a rule
must be a non-decreasing function on C. A rule f satisfies RA when it is additive in the cost matrix
for each pair of “similar” problems. Thus, generalized obligation rules are characterized with SCM
and RA.
Using the characterization of generalized obligation rules we provide two new characterizations of
obligation rules. The first one with SCM , RA, and core selection, and the second one with SCM ,
RA, and separability. Core Selection says that no coalition of agents has incentives to build their own
minimal tree. It is equivalent to say that the allocation is in the core of the problem. Separability
says that if two subsets of agents, S and N \ S, can connect to the source separately or can connect
jointly, and there are no savings when they connect jointly, the agents must pay the same in both
circumstances. Besides, if we add the property of symmetry, namely symmetric agents with respect
to their connection costs should pay the same, we obtain two new characterizations for the folk rule.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems.
In Section 3 we define generalized obligation rules. In Section 4 we present the characterizations for
obligation rules and the folk rule.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems and the notation used in the paper.
Let N ⊂ N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite subset N ⊂ N , an order pi
on N is a bijection pi : N −→ {1, . . . , |N |} where, for each i ∈ N , pi (i) is the position of agent i. Let
ΠN denote the set of all orders on N .
For each S ⊂ N , let ∆(S) =
{
x ∈ RS+ :
∑
i∈S
xi = 1
}
.
Usually, we consider N = {1, . . . , |N |} as the set of agents and 0 as a special element called the
source. We denote N0 = N ∪ {0} .
A cost matrix C = (cij)i,j∈N0 gives the cost of a direct link between any two nodes. We assume
symmetric costs, i.e., for each i, j ∈ N0, cij = cji ≥ 0 and for each i ∈ N0, cii = 0.
We denote the set of all cost matrices with agent set N by CN . Given C, C ′ ∈ CN we say that
C ≤ C ′ if for each i, j ∈ N0, cij ≤ c′ij .
A minimum cost spanning tree problem, briefly referred to as an mcstp, is a pair (N0, C) where
N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ CN is a cost matrix. Given an mcstp (N0, C)
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and S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction of the mcstp to S0 = S ∪ {0} by (S0, C).
A network g over N0 is a subset of {(i, j) : i, j ∈ N0, i 6= j}. The elements of g are called arcs.
Since we assume symmetric costs, we work with undirected arcs, i.e., (i, j) = (j, i).
Given a network g and a pair of distinct nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g is a sequence
of distinct arcs gij = {(is−1, is)}ps=1 that satisfy (is−1, is) ∈ g for each s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, i = i0 and
j = ip. A cycle is a path from i to i different from (i, i). Given i, j ∈ N0, we say that i, and j are
connected in g if there exists a path from i to j.
A tree is a network such that for each i ∈ N, there is a unique path from i to the source.
We denote the set of all networks over N0 by GN and the set of networks over N0 in such a way
that every agent in N is connected to the source by GN0 .
Given a network g, let P (g) = {Sk(g)}n(g)k=1 denote the partition of N0 in connected components
induced by g. Formally, P (g) is the only partition of N0 satisfying these two properties:
• If i, j ∈ Sk(g), then i and j are connected in g.
• If i ∈ Sk(g), j ∈ Sl(g) and k 6= l, then i and j are not connected in g.
Given a network g and i ∈ N0, let S(P (g), i) denote the element of P (g) to which i belongs to.
Norde et al (2004) [20] prove that every mcstp can be written as a non-negative combination of
mcstp in which the costs of the arcs are 0 or 1. The next lemma states, using our notation, this result
in a slightly different but equivalent way.
Lemma 0. For each mcstp (N0, C), there exists a family {Cq}m(C)q=1 of cost matrices and a family
{xq}m(C)q=1 of non-negative real numbers satisfying three conditions:
(1) C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq.
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . ,m(C)}, there exists a network gq such that cqij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ gq and
cqij = 0 otherwise.
(3) Let q ∈ {1, . . . ,m(C)} and {i, j, k, l} ⊂ N0. If cij ≤ ckl, then cqij ≤ cqkl.
Given an mcstp (N0, C) and g ∈ GN , we define the cost associated with g as
c(N0, C, g) =
∑
(i,j)∈g
cij .
When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N0, C, g).
A minimal tree for (N0, C), briefly referred to as an mt, is a tree t ∈ GN0 such that c(t) = min
g∈GN0
c(g).
An mt always exists, although it may not be unique. Given an mcstp (N0, C), m(N0, C) denotes the
cost of any mt t in (N0, C).
After obtaining an mt, one of the most important issues addressed in the literature on mcstp is
how to divide its cost m(N0, C) among the agents. A cost allocation rule is a map f that associates
with each mcstp (N0, C) a vector f(N0, C) ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N
fi(N0, C) = m(N0, C). Given an
agent i ∈ N , fi(N0, C) denotes its payment.
Kruskal (1956) [15] defines an algorithm for constructing an mt. The idea is quite simple, the mt
is constructed by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest cost without introducing cycles. Formally,
Kruskal’s algorithm is defined as follows.
We start with A0(C) = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N0, i 6= j} and g0(C) = ∅.
Stage 1: Take an arc (i, j) ∈ A0 (C) such that cij = min
(k,l)∈A0(C)
{ckl} . If there are several arcs
satisfying this condition, select just one. We have that(
i1 (C) , j1 (C)
)
= (i, j) ,
A1 (C) = A0 (C) \ {(i, j)} , and
g1 (C) =
{(
i1 (C) , j1 (C)
)}
.
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Stage p + 1. We have defined the sets Ap (C) and gp (C). Take an arc (i, j) ∈ Ap (C) such that
cij = min
(k,l)∈Ap(C)
{ckl} . If there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one. Two cases
are possible:
1. gp (C) ∪ {(i, j)} has a cycle. Go to the beginning of Stage p+ 1 with Ap (C) = Ap (C) \ {(i, j)}
and gp (C) the same.
2. gp (C) ∪ {(i, j)} has no cycles. Take (ip+1 (C) , jp+1 (C)) = (i, j) , Ap+1 (C) = Ap (C) \ {(i, j)},
and gp+1 (C) = gp (C) ∪ {(ip+1 (C) , jp+1 (C))} . Go to Stage p+ 2.
This process is completed in |N | stages. We say that g|N |(C) is a tree obtained following Kruskal’s
algorithm. Note that this algorithm leads to a tree, but this is not always unique.
When there is no ambiguity, we writeAp, gp, and (ip, jp) instead ofAp(C), gp(C), and (ip(C), jp(C)),
respectively.
Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3] define a family of rules through Kruskal’s algorithm. At each step of
the algorithm, an arc is added to the network. Once we add the arc, we divide its cost among the
agents. Let % be a function specifying the part of the cost paid by each agent. Each agent will pay
the sum of the costs paid in each arc selected by Kruskal’s algorithm.
Let P (N0) denote the set of all partitions over N0. Let P = {S0, S1, . . . , Sm} be a generic element
of P (N0) such that 0 ∈ S0. Given P, P ′ ∈ P (N0) we say that P is finer than P ′ if for each S ∈ P ,
there exists T ∈ P ′ such that S ⊂ T . Given P, P ′ ∈ P (N0) we say that P is 1-finer than P ′ if P ′ is
obtained joining two elements of P. Namely, if P = {S0, S1, . . . , Sm} and P is 1-finer than P ′ then,
there exist Sk, Sl ∈ P such that P ′ = {P \ {Sk, Sl} , Sk ∪ Sl} .
A sharing function % is a function associating with each pair of partitions (P, P ′) where P is 1-finer
than P ′, a vector % (P, P ′) ∈ ∆ (N) satisfying the following path independence condition.
Let P , P ′ ∈ P (N0) be such that P is finer than P ′. Assume that
{
P 11 , P
1
2 , ..., P
1
q
}
and
{
P 21 , P
2
2 , ..., P
2
q
}
are two sequences of partitions satisfying that P 11 = P
2
1 = P, P
1
q = P
2
q = P
′ and P ip is 1-finer than
P ip+1 for each i = 1, 2 and p = 1, ..., q − 1. Then, for each i ∈ N,
q−1∑
p=1
%i
(
P 1p , P
1
p+1
)
=
q−1∑
p=1
%i
(
P 2p , P
2
p+1
)
.
We can associate with each sharing function % the rule f% in mcstp defined as follows. For each
mcstp (N0, C) and each i ∈ N, we define
f%i (N0, C) =
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
[
%i
(
P
(
gp−1
)
, P (gp)
)]
.
Since Kruskal’s algorithm can produce several trees, f% could depend on the tree g|N | selected.
Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3] prove that this is not the case. Thus, f% is well defined for each sharing
function %.
3 Generalized obligation rules
Tijs et al (2006) [23] introduce obligation rules for mcstp through obligation functions. For each
obligation function o we can associate an obligation rule fo. We define generalized obligation functions.
Applying the same ideas as in Tijs et al (2006) [23], for each generalized obligation function θ, we
define the rule fθ. The main result of this section says that the set of rules associated with generalized
obligation functions coincides with the set of rules associated with sharing functions introduced in
Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3].
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Tijs et al (2006) [23] define obligation rules through a matrix called the contribution matrix.
They also mention that obligation rules can be obtained through Kruskal’s algorithm. We present
the definition of obligation rules through Kruskal’s algorithm in order to adapt it to this paper.
Given N ⊂ N , an obligation function for N is a map o that assigns to each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} a vector
o(S) ∈ RS satisfying the following conditions. For each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} such that 0 /∈ S, o(S) ∈ ∆(S).
For each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} such that 0 ∈ S, oi(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S. For each S, T ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} with
S ⊂ T and i ∈ S, oi(S) ≥ oi(T ).
We can associate an obligation rule fo with each obligation function o as follows. At each stage
of Kruskal’s algorithm an arc (ip, jp) is added to the network. The cost of this arc will be paid by
the agents who benefit from its construction. We compute the amount paid by each agent using the
obligation function.
Given an mcstp (N0, C) and i ∈ N ,
foi (N0, C) =
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (gp), i)))
where (ip, jp) and gp are obtained through Kruskal’s algorithm.
Tijs et al (2006) [23] prove that fo is an allocation rule in mcstp, i.e., it does not depend on the
mt chosen by Kruskal’s algorithm.
We define a generalized obligation function as a map θ : P (N0)→ RN satisfying three conditions
for each P = {S0, S1, . . . , Sm}:
1. θi(P ) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N.
2.
∑
i∈N
θi(P ) = m.
3. If P is finer than P ′ then, θi(P ) ≥ θi(P ′) for each i ∈ N .
We first prove that obligation functions can be considered as a subset of generalized obligation
functions. Given an obligation function o, P ∈ P (N), and i ∈ S ∈ P, we define θo : P (N0) → RN
such that θoi (P ) = oi(S).
Proposition 1. θo is a generalized obligation function.
Proof. We prove that θo satisfies the three conditions of the definition of a generalized obligation
function.
1. θoi (P ) = oi(S) ≥ 0.
2. Given P = {S0, ..., Sm} ∈ P (N0),
∑
i∈N
θoi (P ) =
m∑
q=0
∑
i∈Sq
θoi (P ) =
m∑
q=0
∑
i∈Sq
oi(Sq).
Since o(S) ∈ ∆(S) for each S ⊂ N and oi(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S such that 0 ∈ S we conclude
that
m∑
q=0
∑
i∈Sq
oi(Sq) =
m∑
q=1
1 = m.
3. Consider P, P ′ ∈ P (N0) such that P is finer than P ′ and i ∈ N . Thus, θoi (P ) = oi(S) where
i ∈ S ∈ P . Since P is finer that P ′, there exists S′ ∈ P ′ such that i ∈ S ⊂ S′. Therefore,
θoi (P
′) = oi (S′) . Since oi(S) ≥ oi(S′) when i ∈ S ⊂ S′ ⊂ N0, we conclude that θoi (P ) ≥ θoi (P ′).

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If θo is the generalized obligation function induced by the obligation function o, P ∈ P (N0) and
i ∈ S ∈ P then, θoi only depends on S. Nevertheless if θ is a generalized obligation function, θi depends
on S but also on the rest of the agents (N0 \ S) . Thus, we can think of obligation functions as the
subset of generalized obligation functions where there are no externalities.
We say that f is a generalized obligation rule if there exists a generalized obligation function θ
such that for each (N0, C) and i ∈ N ,
fi(N0, C) =
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp(θi(P (g
p−1))− θi(P (gp))).
In this case we denote f = fθ and we say that fθ is the generalized obligation rule associated with
the generalized obligation function θ.
Remark 1. By Proposition 1, if fo is the obligation rule associated with the obligation function o,
then fo = fθ
o
. Namely, fo is the generalized obligation rule associated with the generalized obligation
function θo. Hence, obligation rules are a subset of generalized obligation rules.
We now prove that the set of generalized obligation rules coincides with the set of rules associated
with sharing functions.
Theorem 1.{
fθ : θ is a generalized obligation function
}
= {f% : % is a sharing function}
Proof. “⊃”
Let f% be such that % is a sharing function.
Let P = {S0, S1, ..., Sm} ∈ P (N0). There exists a sequence {P0, P1,..., Pm} ⊂ P (N0) such that
P0 = P, Pm = {N0} , and for each q = 1, ...,m, Pq−1 is 1-finer than Pq. Note that this sequence may
not be unique. We define
θ (P ) =
m∑
q=1
% (Pq−1, Pq) .
Since % satisfies the path independence condition, θ (P ) does not depend on the sequence {P0, ..., Pm} .
Thus, θ (P ) is well defined.
We now prove that θ is a generalized obligation function.
1. Since %i (P, P
′) ≥ 0 for each P, P ′ ∈ P (N0) with P 1-finer than P ′ and each i ∈ N, we deduce
that θi(P ) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N.
2. ∑
i∈N
θi(P ) =
∑
i∈N
m∑
q=1
%i (Pq−1, Pq)
=
m∑
q=1
(∑
i∈N
%i (Pq−1, Pq)
)
=
m∑
q=1
1 = m.
3. Assume that P = {S0, ..., Sm} is finer than P ′ = {S′0, ..., S′m′} . Then, m′ < m and there exists
a sequence {P0, P1,..., Pm} ⊂ P (N0) such that P0 = P, Pm = {N0} , for each q = 1, ...,m, Pq−1
is 1-finer than Pq, and Pm−m′ = P ′. Thus, given i ∈ N,
θi(P
′) =
m∑
q=m−m′+1
%i (Pq−1, Pq) .
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Now,
θi(P ) =
m∑
q=1
%i (Pq−1, Pq) =
m−m′∑
q=1
%i (Pq−1, Pq) + θi(P ′).
By definition of %, %i (Pq−1, Pq) ≥ 0 for each q = 1, ...,m−m′. Thus, θi(P ) ≥ θi(P ′).
We have proved that θ is a generalized obligation function.
We now prove that fθ = f%. By 3 we have that if P is 1-finer than P ′ and i ∈ N, then
θi(P )− θi(P ′) = %i (P, P ′) .
Now it is trivial to see that fθ = f%.
“ ⊂ ”
Let fθ be such that θ is a generalized obligation function.
Given P, P ′ ∈ P (N0) where P is 1-finer than P ′, we define
%(P, P ′) = θ (P )− θ (P ′) .
Next we prove that % is a sharing function:
1. Assume that P is 1-finer than P ′. We prove that %(P, P ′) ∈ ∆ (N) .
(a) Since P is finer than P ′ and θ is a generalized obligation function, θ (P ) ≥ θ (P ′). Hence,
%i(P, P
′) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N.
(b) Assume that P = {S0, S1, ..., Sm} . Thus, P ′ =
{
S′0, S
′
1, ..., S
′
m−1
}
. Now∑
i∈N
%i(P, P
′) =
∑
i∈N
θi (P )−
∑
i∈N
θi (P
′) = m− (m− 1) = 1.
2. We prove that % satisfies the path independence condition. Assume that
{
P 11 , P
1
2 , ..., P
1
k
}
and{
P 21 , P
2
2 , ..., P
2
k
}
are two sequences of partitions satisfying that P 11 = P
2
1 = P, P
1
k = P
2
k = P
′
and P iq is 1-finer than P
i
q+1 for each i = 1, 2 and q = 1, ..., k − 1. For each i ∈ N,
k−1∑
q=1
%i
(
P 1q , P
1
q+1
)
=
k−1∑
q=1
(
θi
(
P 1q
)− θi (P 1q+1))
= θi
(
P 11
)− θi (P 1k )
= θi (P )− θi (P ′) .
Analogously, we can prove that
k−1∑
q=1
%i
(
P 2q , P
2
q+1
)
= θi (P )− θi (P ′) .
We have proved that % is a sharing function. Now it is trivial to see that fθ = f%. 
We end this section by comparing generalized obligation rules with other sets of rules in the
literature.
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-Freire (2008a, 2008b) [4] [5] introduce optimistic weighted Shapley rules.
They prove that these rules are obligation rules. Thus, they are also generalized obligation rules.
Moretti et al (2009) [19] introduce construct and charge (CC) rules. CC rules depend on a
charge system specifying how to charge agents during the construction of a spanning tree. The charge
systems must satisfy three properties: connection, involvement and total aggregation. By Theorem
1, generalized obligation functions can be interpreted in a similar way using the sharing functions. It
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is trivial to see that sharing functions satisfy total aggregation but fail connection and involvement.
Thus, generalized obligation rules can be seen also as a generalization of construct and charge rules,
when the order in which we construct the spanning tree is given by Kruskal’s algorithm. If the
spanning tree is constructed following a different order, then CC rules are, in general, different from
generalized obligation rules. As a consequence both sets of rules are unrelated.
Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010) [1] prove that obligation rules are a subset of the set of marginalistic
values of the irreducible form. In general, marginalistic values and generalized obligation rules are
unrelated. There exist marginalistic values that are not generalized obligation rules. Let f be a
marginalistic value satisfying that
∑
i∈N
fi(N0, C) 6= m(N0, C) for some (N0, C). Thus, f cannot be a
generalized obligation rule. Also, there exist generalized obligation rules that are not marginalistic
values. Let θ be such that for any P, θi (P ) = 0 when i 6= j. Thus, fθj (N0, C) = m(N0, C) and
fθi (N0, C) = 0 when i 6= j. Let (N0, C) be such that cij = 1 for each i, j ∈ N0. Any marginalistic
value f satisfies that fi(N0, C) = 1 for each i ∈ N.
4 The characterizations of obligation rules
Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3] characterize the set of rules induced by sharing functions, and hence
generalized obligation rules, as the set of rules satisfying restricted additivity and strong cost mono-
tonicity. Adding some properties to the ones used in this result, we can obtain characterizations for
the family of obligation rules and for the folk rule. We first consider two properties: core selection
(the rule is in the core of the problem) and separability (if there are no savings when two groups of
agents connect jointly, agents must pay the same when they connect jointly or separately). The main
result of this section says that if we add core selection or separability to restricted additivity and
strong cost monotonicity, we obtain two characterizations for obligation rules. If we add symmetry
to both characterizations of obligation rules we characterize a single rule, the folk rule.
We introduce the properties used to characterize obligation rules.
Strong Cost Monotonicity ( SCM): for each pair of mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) such that C ≤ C ′,
f(N0, C) ≤ f(N0, C ′).
This property implies that if some connection costs increase, no agent ends up better off. It ap-
pears, for instance, in Tijs et al (2006) [23], Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6], and Bergantin˜os
and Kar (2010) [1].
Additivity is a standard property and it has been used in many situations. In the case of mcstp,
additivity says that if we have two mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′), then f(N0, C + C ′) = f(N0, C) +
f(N0, C
′). But the usual additivity property is incompatible with efficiency
( ∑
i∈N
fi (N0, C) =
m(N0, C)
)
, so, no rule satisfies additivity. Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2009) [8] introduce the
restricted additivity property, which has been used later by Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16].
The mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) are similar if there exists an mt t = {(i0, i)}i∈N in (N0, C),
(N0, C
′), and (N0, C + C ′) and an order pi = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ ΠN such that ci01i1 ≤ ci02i2 ≤ . . . ≤ ci0nin
and c′
i01i1
≤ c′
i02i2
≤ . . . ≤ c′i0nin , i.e., the arcs in the mt t are ordered in the same way in both problems.
Restricted Additivity (RA): for each pair of similar mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′),
f(N0, C + C
′) = f(N0, C) + f(N0, C ′).
From a mathematical point of view, RA is an appealing property because if a rule is additive the
initial problem can be decomposed in a sum of simpler problems which are usually easier to solve.
So, an additive rule is easier to compute. Besides, in many problems it is possible to characterize
rules with additivity and very “basic” properties. For example, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b),
one of the most important solutions for games with transferable utility, is characterized by means
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of additivity, efficiency, symmetry, and dummy player. There are many values satisfying efficiency,
symmetry, and dummy player, for example the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969 [22]), but the Shapley
value is the only one which satisfies additivity.
Moreover, given an mcstp (N0, C), assume that some additional costs that were not considered
in the initial problem appear. Besides, assume that the mcstp associated with these extra costs is
similar to (N0, C). Then, RA says that the cost allocation provided by the rule should be the same
if the problem is reevaluated considering these extra costs or if we sum up the initial allocation and
the allocation of these extra costs.
Core Selection (CS): for each mcstp (N0, C) and each S ⊂ N ,∑
i∈S
fi(N0, C) ≤ m(S0, C).
CS says that no coalition of agents has incentives to build their own mt. This is a standard
property which has been used in many papers. For instance Bird (1976) [9], Granot and Huberman
(1981) [14], Dutta and Kar (2004) [11], and Faigle et al (1997) [12].
Separability (SEP ): for each mcstp (N0, C) and each S ⊂ N such that m(N0, C) = m(S0, C) +
m((N \ S)0, C),
fi(N0, C) =
{
fi(S0, C) when i ∈ S
fi((N \ S)0, C) when i ∈ N \ S.
Two subsets of agents, S and N \ S, can connect to the source separately or can connect jointly.
If there are no savings when they connect jointly, SEP says that agents must pay the same in both
circumstances. This property appears in Megiddo (1978) [18], Granot and Huberman (1981) [14], and
Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6].
We now present the characterizations of obligation rules.
Theorem 2. (a) f satisfies RA, SCM , and CS if and only if f is an obligation rule.
(b) f satisfies RA, SCM , and SEP if and only if f is an obligation rule.
Proof. (a) We first prove that obligation rules satisfy the three properties. Lorenzo and Lorenzo-
Freire (2009) [16] prove that obligation rules satisfy RA. Tijs et al (2006) [23] prove that obligation
rules satisfy SCM and population monotonicity (PM). Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] prove
that population monotonicity implies CS.
Assume that f satisfies RA, SCM , and CS. We prove that there exists an obligation function o
such that f = fo.
By Theorem 1 in Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3], there exists a sharing function % such that f(N0, C) =
f%(N0, C).
Given P = {S0, S1, . . . , Sm} ∈ P (N0), we define the mcstp (N0, CP ) where cPij = 0 if i, j ∈ Sk for
any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m} and cPij = 1 if i ∈ Sk, j ∈ Sk′ with k, k′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}, k 6= k′.
By the proof of Theorem 1 in Bergantin˜os et al (2010) [3], if P is 1-finer than P ′, then % (P, P ′) =
f(N0, C
P )− f(N0, CP ′).
By Theorem 1, there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that f%(N0, C) = f
θ(N0, C).
By the proof of Theorem 1, given P = {S0, ..., Sm} ∈ P (N0),
θ (P ) =
m∑
q=1
% (Pq−1, Pq)
where P0 = P and Pm = {N0} . Thus,
θ (P ) =
m∑
q=1
(
f(N0, C
Pq−1)− f(N0, CPq )
)
= f(N0, C
P )− f
(
N0, C
{N0}
)
.
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Since f satisfies RA and SCM, fi
(
N0, C
{N0}) = 0 for each i ∈ N. Thus, f = fθ where for each
P ∈ P (N0) and each i ∈ N , θi(P ) = fi(N0, CP ).
Given P ∈ P (N0) with i ∈ S ∈ P , we define PS = {S, {j}j∈N0\S} ∈ P (N0). Since PS is finer
than P , CP ≤ CPS . Since f satisfies SCM, f(N0, CP ) ≤ f(N0, CPS ). By CS,
∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
PS ) ≤
m(S0, C
PS ). Thus,
0 ≤
∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
P ) ≤
∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
PS ) ≤ m(S0, CPS ) =
{
0 when 0 ∈ S
1 when 0 /∈ S. .
When 0 ∈ S, ∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
P ) =
∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
PS ) = 0. Since
∑
j∈N
fj(N0, C
P ) = m
(
N0, C
P
)
= m,∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
P ) =
∑
j∈S
fj(N0, C
PS ) = 1 when 0 /∈ S. Since f(N0, CP ) ≤ f(N0, CPS ), fi(N0, CP ) =
fi(N0, C
PS ).
Let us define the map o that assigns to each S ∈ 2N \ {∅} the vector o(S) ∈ RS such that
oi(S) = θi(P
S) for each i ∈ S. We prove that o is an obligation function.
• oi(S) = θi(PS) ≥ 0 and∑
i∈S
θi(P
S) =
∑
i∈S
fi
(
N0, C
PS
)
=
{
0 when 0 ∈ S
1 when 0 /∈ S
Thus, o(S) ∈ ∆(S) when 0 /∈ S. Moreover, when 0 ∈ S, oi(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S.
• Let i ∈ S ⊂ T . Clearly, PS is finer than PT . Therefore, θi(PS) ≥ θi(PT ) and, hence,
oi(S) = θi(P
S) ≥ θi(PT ) = oi(T ).
We now prove that fθ = fo.
If i ∈ S ∈ P, then
θi(P ) = fi
(
N0, C
P
)
= fi
(
N0, C
PS
)
= θi(P
S) = oi (S) .
Given a partition P ∈ P (N0) remember that S(P, i) denotes the element of the partition P to
which i belongs to. Thus,
fθi (N0, C) =
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
θi(P (g
p−1))− θi(P (gp))
)
=
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
fi
(
N0, C
P (gp−1)
)
− fi
(
N0, C
P (gp)
))
=
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
fi
(
N0, C
P
S(P (gp−1),i)
)
− fi
(
N0, C
PS(P (g
p),i)
))
=
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
θi
(
PS(P (g
p−1),i)
)
− θi
(
PS(P (g
p),i)
))
=
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (gp), i))
)
= foi (N0, C).
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(b) We know that obligation rules satisfy RA, SCM , and PM . Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga
(2007a) [6] prove that PM implies SEP .
Consider an allocation rule f satisfying RA, SCM , and SEP . Using similar arguments to those
used in (a), we can conclude that there exists a generalized obligation function θ such that f = fθ.
Moreover, for each P ∈ P (N0) , θ (P ) = f
(
N0, C
P
)
.
Given P = {S0, S1, . . . , Sm}, it is easy to prove that m(N0, CP ) = m(S0, CP ) +
m∑
k=1
m((Sk)0, C
P ).
Let i ∈ S0 ∩ N. Since f satisfies SEP, fi(N0, CP ) = fi(S0, CP ). Therefore,
∑
j∈S0
fj(N0, C
P ) =∑
j∈S0
fj(S0, C
P ) = m(S0, C
P ) = 0.
Let k ∈ {1, ...,m} and i ∈ Sk. Since f satisfies SEP, fi(N0, CP ) = fi((Sk)0, CP ). Therefore,∑
j∈Sk
fj(N0, C
P ) =
∑
j∈Sk
fj((Sk)0, C
P ) = m((Sk)0, C
P ) = 1.
Using similar arguments to those used in (a), it can be proved that the map o assigning to each
S ∈ 2N \ {∅} the vector o(S) = θ(PS) is an obligation function and f = fo. 
Let us introduce two properties which will be used later.
A rule f satisfies Population Monotonicity (PM) if for each (N0, C), S ⊂ T ⊂ N, and i ∈ N , we
have that fi (T0, C) ≤ fi (S0, C).
A rule f satisfies Cone-wise positive linearity (CPL) if for each (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) satisfying
that there exists an order σ : {(i, j)}i,j∈N0,i<j →
{
1, 2, ...., n(n+1)2
}
such that for each i, j, k, l ∈ N0
satisfying that σ (i, j) ≤ σ (k, l) , then cij ≤ ckl and c′ij ≤ c′kl, then f (N0, C + C ′) = f(N0, C) +
f (N0, C
′).
Remark 2. The properties used in Theorem 2 are independent. We will do the following:
(i) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and SCM but fails CS and SEP . Thus, CS is in-
dependent of RA and SCM in part (a). Moreover, SEP is independent of RA and SCM in part
(b).
Let f be the egalitarian rule, i.e., fi(N0, C) =
1
|N |m(N0, C) for each i ∈ N .
It is trivial to see that f satisfies RA and SCM . Nevertheless, f does not satisfy SEP and CS.
Let (N0, C) be such that N = {1, 2} and
C =
 0 1 21 0 2
2 2 0
 .
f does not satisfy CS because f1(N0, C) = 1.5 ≥ m({1}0, C) = 1.
f does not satisfy SEP because m(N0, C) = m({1}0, C) +m({2}0, C) but f1(N0, C) = 1.5 6= 1 =
f1({1}0, C).
(ii) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and SEP but fails SCM . Thus, SCM is independent
of RA and SEP in part (b).
Let u be a function assigning to each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} a vector u(S) ∈ RS satisfying the following
conditions. For each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} such that 0 /∈ S, ∑
i∈S
ui(S) = 1. For each S ∈ 2N0 \ {∅} such that
0 ∈ S, ui(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S. By convenience we take ui (∅) = 0 for each i ∈ N .
We can associate with each function u a rule fu as in the case of an obligation rule fo associated
with an obligation function o. Namely, given an mcstp (N0, C), let g
|N | be a tree obtained applying
Kruskal’s algorithm to (N0, C). For each i ∈ N ,
fui (N0, C) =
|N |∑
p=1
cipjp
(
ui
(
S
(
P
(
gp−1
)
, i
))− ui (S (P (gp) , i))) .
11
Tijs et al (2006) [23] prove that obligation rules are well defined. Using arguments similar to those
used by them, we can prove that fu is well defined.
Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] prove that obligation rules satisfy RA. Using similar
arguments to those used by them, we can prove that fu satisfies RA.
Claim 1. fu satisfies SEP for each u. We avoid the proof.
We now prove that fu does not satisfy SCM for some u. We first define u. Given S ⊂ N ,
ui(S) =

−0.5 if S = {i, j} and i < j
1.5 if S = {i, j} and i > j
1
|S| otherwise.
Note that if 0 ∈ S, ui(S) = 0 for each i ∈ S \ {0}.
Let (N0, C
x) be such that N = {1, 2}, x > 0, and
Cx =
 0 10 + x 9010 + x 0 2
90 2 0
 .
Thus,
fu1 (N0, C
4) = c412(1 + 0.5) + c
4
01(−0.5) = −4 and
fu1 (N0, C
8) = c812(1 + 0.5) + c
8
01(−0.5) = −6.
Since C4 ≤ C8 we have that fu does not satisfy SCM .
(iii) We define a rule f which satisfies SCM , SEP , and CS but fails RA. Thus, RA is independent
of SCM and CS in part (a). Moreover, RA is independent of SCM and SEP in part (b).
Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010) [1] prove that there exists a rule f which satisfies SCM and PM but
fails CPL. Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2009) [8] prove that if a rule satisfies RA, then the rule also
satisfies CPL. Thus, f does not satisfy RA.
Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] prove that PM implies SEP and CS. Thus, f also
satisfies SEP and CS.
(iv) We define a rule f which satisfies RA and CS but fails SCM . Thus, SCM is independent of
RA and CS in part (a).
Given an mcstp (N0, C) and an mt t, Bird (1976) [9] defined the minimal network (N0, C
t)
associated with t as follows: ctij = max
(k,l)∈gij
{ckl}, where gij denotes the unique path in t from i to
j. It is well known that the minimal network is independent of the mt t chosen. Thus, Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6] define the irreducible form (N0, C
∗) of an mcstp (N0, C) as the minimal
network (N0, C
t) associated with some mt t.
We define a decomposition of C∗ in the conditions of Lemma 0. Let us clarify the decomposition
in the next example.
C∗ =
 0 4 44 0 2
4 2 0
 = 2
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
+ (4− 2)
 0 1 11 0 0
1 0 0

We now present the decomposition in general. Let t = {(i0, i)} be an mt in (N0, C∗). Assume,
without loss of generality, that c∗101 ≤ c∗202 ≤ . . . ≤ c∗|N |0|N |. Consider i0 = 0 and define
i1 = max
{
i ∈ N : c∗i0i = min
j∈N
c∗j0j
}
iq = max
i ∈ N : c∗i0i = minj∈N,c∗
j0j
>c∗
i0
q−1iq−1
c∗j0j
 for each q = 2, . . . ,m(C∗).
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Since C∗ is an irreducible network, there are at most |N | different costs in C∗. Thus, m (C∗) ≤ |N |
and hence, iq is well defined for each q = 1, . . . ,m(C
∗).
We define x1 = c∗
i01i1
, and for each q = 2, . . . ,m(C∗), xq = c∗i0qiq − c
∗
i0q−1iq−1
. Moreover, for each
q = 1, . . . ,m(C∗), C∗q is given by
c∗qij =
{
0 if c∗ij < c
∗
i0qiq
1 otherwise.
It is trivial to see that C∗ =
m(C∗)∑
q=1
xqC∗q and that the decomposition satisfies the conditions of
Lemma 0.
Let fo be the obligation rule associated with the obligation function
oi(S) =
{
1 if i = min
j∈S
{j}
0 otherwise.
We define f in the following way:
f(N0, C) =
m(C∗)∑
q=1
xqf ′(N0, C∗q)
where
f ′i(N0, C
∗q) =

1
|N | if c
∗q
ij = 0 for each i, j ∈ N and c∗q0i = 1 for each i ∈ N,
foi (N0, C
∗q) otherwise.
Claim 2. f satisfies CS. We avoid the proof.
Claim 3. f satisfies RA. We avoid the proof.
f does not satisfy SCM . Let N = {1, 2, 3} and C be such that cij = 0 for each i, j ∈ N and
c0i = 1 for each i ∈ N . Let C ′ be such that c′23 = c′13 = 1 and c′ij = cij otherwise. C ′ ≥ C but
f2(N0, C) =
1
3
> 0 = f2(N0, C
′). Thus f does not satisfy SCM.
Note that not all core allocations are obligation rules. Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010) [1] proved
that the set of vectors of marginal contributions of the irreducible game vC∗ (see Bergantin˜os and
Vidal-Puga, 2007b [7]) is a subset of the family of obligation rules. Since the game vC∗ is concave, the
core of this game coincides with the convex hull of the set of vectors of marginal contributions which
coincides with the irreducible core of the original game v (see Bird 1976 [9]). Thus, the irreducible
core, which is a proper subset of the core, is a subset of the family of obligations rules. Moreover, the
set of allocations induced by rules satisfying PM and SCM coincides with the set of allocations in the
irreducible core. Since obligation rules satisfy both properties, they are contained in the irreducible
core. Thus, an allocation is induced by an obligation rule if and only if it belongs to the irreducible
core. So, there are allocations in the core that are not obligation rules. Besides, to study if an
allocation is the outcome of an obligation rule, will be the same as to study if it belongs to the
irreducible core and computing the irreducible core through the definition is an NP-hard problem
because we have to compute the value of all coalitions and all vectors of marginal contributions.
Obligation rules have been characterized in Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] and Bergantin˜os
and Kar (2010) [1]. Let us compare all these characterizations.
Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) [16] characterize obligation rules with RA and PM . Thus,
under RA, PM is a strong property. If a rule satisfies PM (and RA) it also satisfies SCM . This
result is not true in general, there exist rules satisfying PM but failing SCM (see Bergantin˜os and
Vidal-Puga (2007a) [6]).
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Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010) [1] characterize obligation rules with SCM, PM, and CPL. In The-
orem 2 we use CS or SEP instead of PM and RA instead of CPL. Thus, in order to obtain a tight
characterization of obligation rules, if we weaken PM until CS or SEP, then we must strengthen
CPL until RA. Analogously, if we weaken RA until CPL in our results, then we must strengthen CS
or SEP until PM .
Feltkamp et al (1994) [13] introduce the folk rule in mcstp, which has been studied later in
Branzei et al (2004) [10] and Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a, 2007b, 2009) [6] [7] [8]. Given a
mcstp (N0, C) Tijs et al (2006) prove that the folk rule is the obligation rule f
o where for each S ∈ N0
and each i ∈ S the obligation function o is defined as follows:
oi(S) =

1
|S| if 0 /∈ S
0 otherwise.
As a corollary of Theorem 2 we can give two new axiomatic characterizations of this rule. In order
to do so, we need to introduce the property of symmetry.
We say that i, j ∈ N are symmetric if for each k ∈ N0 \ {i, j}, cik = cjk.
We say that f satisfies Symmetry (SYM) if for each mcstp (N0, C) and each pair of symmetric
agents i, j ∈ N , fi(N0, C) = fj(N0, C).
Corollary 1. (a) The folk rule is the unique rule satisfying RA, SCM , CS, and SYM .
(b) The folk rule is the unique rule satisfying RA, SCM , SEP , and SYM .
Proof. (a) We first prove that the folk rule satisfies these properties.
By Theorem 2.(a), the folk rule satisfies RA, SCM , and CS. Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a)
[6] prove that the folk rule satisfies SYM .
We now prove the uniqueness. Let f be a rule satisfying the four properties. By the proof of
Theorem 2.(a), f is an obligation rule where oi(S) = fi(N0, C
PS ). Moreover, we know that∑
i∈S
oi(S) =
∑
i∈S
fi(N0, C
PS ) =
{
1 when 0 /∈ S
0 when 0 ∈ S.
By definition of CP
S
, all the agents in S are symmetric. Since f satisfies SYM , we have that
given i ∈ S,
oi(S) = fi(N0, C
PS ) =

1
|S| if 0 /∈ S
0 otherwise.
This finishes the proof of (a). The proof of (b) is similar and we omit it. 
The properties used in these characterizations of the folk rule are not independent.
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